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The
Threat From Within
Article
Interact Pakistan –
Pervez Hoodbhoy May 31, 2007
Tags: Radicalism , Extremism , Pakistan
A version of this study was published on Chowk under the title What Next After
Karachi’s Carnage?
Twenty five years ago the Pakistani state pushed Islam on to its people as a
matter of policy. Prayers in government departments were deemed compulsory,
punishments were meted out to those who did not fast in Ramadan, selection for
academic posts required that the candidate demonstrate knowledge of Islamic
teachings, and jihad was propagated through schoolbooks. Today government
intervention is no longer needed because of a spontaneous groundswell of Islamic
zeal. The notion of an Islamic state – as yet in some amorphous and diffuse form
– is more popular today across Pakistan than in previous decades. Across the
country there has been a spectacular increase in the power and prestige of the
clerics, attendance in mosques, home prayer meetings (dars and zikr), observance
of special religious festivals, and fasting during Ramadan.
But the state is now beginning to fear its own success as it comes under attack
from religious militants and rival Islamic groups battle each other with heavy
weapons. Even the Pakistan Army – whose men were recruited under the banner of
jihad and which saw itself as the fighting arm of Islam – is now frequently
targeted by suicide bombers. It has lost hundreds of men fighting Al-Qaida and
the Taliban. Old recruiting slogans have been jettisoned, and bearded army
officers are losing out in promotions.
The current official position taken by the government of Pakistan under
President General Pervez Musharraf is that it has rejected the orthodox,
militant, violent Islam imposed by the previous chief of army staff, General
Zia-ul-Haq (who ruled from 1977-1988), in favour of a more ‘modern’ and
‘moderate’ Islam. But Musharraf’s actions, and those of his government and its
allies, are often at odds with this stated policy. In fact, after eight years of
Musharraf’s “enlightened moderation”, it seems there is more continuity than
change. And, with each passing day, it becomes harder to see how such a policy
can hope to stem the tide of religious radicalism that is overwhelming Pakistani
society.
The pace of radicalization has quickened. In the first half of 2007 there were
about two dozen suicide attacks, a phenomenon that was almost unknown in
Pakistan before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. These have occurred in major
cities as well as tribal areas. The targets have been the Pakistan army, police,
incumbent government leaders, and rival Islamic sects. But this is just the tip
of the iceberg.
Pakistan’s tribal areas have undergone a radical transformation. The local
Taliban have closed all girls schools and are enforcing Sharia laws in the areas
under their control. Barbers have been handed 6-foot long death shrouds – shave
and die. Taliban vigilante groups patrol the streets of Miramshah town checking,
among other things, the length of beards, whether the “shalwars” are worn at an
appropriate height above the ankles, and attendance of individuals in the
mosques. A new breed of young militants, trained in madrassas, now call the
shots. They have displaced the leadership of the traditional village elders, the
maliks.
The neo-Taliban have an agenda informed by a peculiar mixture of religion and
tribal values. They demand that all TV sets be destroyed. Polio vaccination has
been declared haram by the ulema, including the influential Maulana Fazalullah
of Mingora, because it would allegedly render the new generation impotent.
Consequently health workers are being targeted for assassination. After a doctor
from the Frontier Medical College administering polio shots to children was shot
dead in March 2007, pressure resulted in the resignation of 70 female workers of
a health organization working in the FATA region. Over 4000 parents have refused
to get their children inoculated and the government has essentially abandoned
the polio elimination campaign.
Sectarian killings are on the rise. An unidentified suicide bomber killed 57
people and eliminated the entire leadership of the “Sunni Movement” when he
leapt on to the stage at a religious gathering in Karachi in April, 2006. Months
earlier, barely a mile down from my university, at the shrine of Bari Imam, 25
Shias were killed in similar attack. In the tribal areas, sectarian tensions
have frequently exploded into open warfare: in the villages of Hangu district,
Sunnis and Shias exchanged light artillery and rocket fire leaving scores dead.
Sectarian clashes erupted again in Parachinar and Dera Ismail Khan in April
2007, with mortars and rockets freely used by both sides. In May 2007, fierce
armed battles broke out between the Ansar-ul-Islam and Lashkar-e-Islam groups in
Bara, while Tank and Mingora saw bloody clashes with the Frontier Constabulary.
The intensification of religious feelings has had many consequences, the most
important of which is depoliticization and demobilization of Pakistan’s people.
The single exception is the large public participation in protesting the
dismissal of the chief justice of Pakistan by General Musharraf on March 8,
2007. But, on every other matter, the destruction of most non-religious
organizations, such as student unions and trade unions, has killed public
expression. This includes action on even specific Muslim causes like US actions
against Iraq, Palestine, or Iran. In the absence of political organizations,
only a few dozen protesters have ventured on to the streets. Nevertheless large
numbers of Pakistanis are driven to fury and violence when they perceive their
faith has been maligned. Mobs set on fire the Punjab Assembly, as well as shops
and cars in Lahore, for an act of blasphemy committed in Denmark. Even as
religious fanaticism grips the population there is a curious, almost fatalistic,
disconnection with the real world which suggests that fellow Muslims don’t
matter any more – only the Faith does.
The Talibanization of Pakistan’s tribal areas has caused alarm, but it is the
rapid developments in the heart of the nation’s capital, Islamabad, that have
stunned many.
Islamabad Under Mullah Terror
Since Jan 21, 2007, vigilante groups from a government funded mosque in
Islamabad, the Lal Masjid, have roamed the streets and bazaars as they impose
Islamic morality and terrorize citizens in full view of the police. Openly
sympathetic to the Taliban and tribal militants fighting the Pakistan army, the
two cleric brothers who head Lal Masjid, Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Abdur
Rashid Ghazi, have attracted a core of banned militant organizations around
them. These include the Jaish-e-Muhammad, considered to be the pioneer of
suicide bombings in the region.
The clerics openly defy the state. Baton wielding burqa-clad students of the
Jamia Hafsa, the women’s Islamic university located next to Lal Masjid, have
forcibly occupied a government building, the Children’s Library. In one of their
many forays outside the seminary, this burqa brigade swooped upon a house, which
they claimed was a brothel, and kidnapped 3 women and a baby.
The male students of Islamabad’s many madrassas are even more active. They
terrorize video shop owners, who they accuse of spreading pornography and vice.
Newspapers have carried pictures of grand bonfires made with seized cassettes
and CDs. Most video stores in Islamabad have now closed down. Their owners duly
repented after a fresh campaign by militants on May 4 bombed a dozen music and
video stores, barber shops and a girls school in the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP).
The Pakistani state has shown astonishing patience. It showed its displeasure in
Karachi on May 12, 2007 with bullets while trying to prevent the chief justice
of Pakistan from addressing a meeting. Others it disagrees with, as in
Balochistan, have been hit with air and artillery power. But the Lal Masjid
clerics operate with impunity. No attempt has been made to cut off their
electricity, gas, phone, or website – or even to shut down their illegal FM
radio station. The chief negotiator appointed by Musharraf, Chaudhry Shujaat
Husain, described the burqa brigade kidnappers as “our daughters”, with whom
negotiations would continue and against whom “no operation could be
contemplated”.
Soon after they went on the warpath, the clerics realized that the government
wanted to play ball. Their initial demand – the rebuilding of 8 illegally
constructed mosques that had been knocked down by Islamabad’s civic
administration – transformed into a demand for enforcing the Shariah in
Pakistan. At a meeting held in the mosque on April 6, over 100 guest religious
leaders from across the country pledged to die for the cause of Islam and
Shariah. On April 12, in an FM broadcast from the Lal Masjid’s illegal FM
station, the clerics issued a threat: “There will be suicide blasts in the nook
and cranny of the country. We have weapons, grenades and we are expert in
manufacturing bombs. We are not afraid of death….”2
Confronting the state – with the state’s connivance
The Lal Masjid head cleric, a former student of my university in Islamabad,
added the following chilling message for our women students in the same
broadcast:
The government should abolish co-education. Quaid-e-Azam University has become a
brothel. Its female professors and students roam in objectionable dresses. I
think I will have to send my daughters of Jamia Hafsa to these immoral women.
They will have to hide themselves in hijab otherwise they will be punished
according to Islam…. Our female students have not issued the threat of throwing
acid on the uncovered faces of women. However, such a threat could be used for
creating the fear of Islam among sinful women. There is no harm in it. There are
far more horrible punishments in the hereafter for such women3.
If the truth be told, QAU resembles a city of walking double-holed tents rather
than the brothel of a sick mullah’s imagination. The last few bare-faced women
are finding it more difficult by the day to resist. But then, that is precisely
the aim of the Islamists. On May 7, a female teacher in the QAU history
department was physically assaulted in her office by a bearded, Taliban-looking
man who screamed that he had instructions from Allah. It is unknown, however,
whether there was a direct link to the Lal Masjid threats. President Musharraf –
who is the chancellor of QAU and often chooses to be involved in rather petty
university administrative affairs – has made no comment on the recent
developments.
On May 18, the al Masjid Brigade – as they have come to be known now – kidnapped
four policemen, two of whom were released in exchange for grant of bail to five
Lal Masjid students. As police gathered outside the mosque, students of Lal
Masjid and Jamia Hafsa also put up a show of strength and dug trenches. Talking
to newsmen, Maulana Ghazi ‘flatly’ refused to continue talks and said that his
people reserved the option of launching countrywide suicide attacks if any
operation was launched against them.
What next? As Islamabad heads the way of Pakistan’s tribal towns, the next
targets will be girls schools, internet cafes, bookshops and western clothing
stores, followed by shops selling toilet paper, tampons, underwear, mannequins,
and other un-Islamic goods.
In a sense, the inevitable is coming to pass. Until a few years ago, Islamabad
was a quiet, orderly, modern city different from all others in Pakistan. Still
earlier it was largely the abode of Pakistan’s hyper-elite and foreign
diplomats. But the rapid transformation of its demography brought with it
hundreds of mosques with multi-barrelled audio-cannons mounted on minarets, as
well as scores of madrassas illegally constructed in what used to be public
parks and green areas. Now, tens of thousands of their students with little
prayer caps dutifully chant the Quran all day. In the evenings they roam in
packs through the city’s streets and bazaars, gaping at store windows and
lustfully ogling bare-faced women.
The stage for transforming Islamabad into a Taliban stronghold is being set. If
at all it is to be prevented, resolute opposition from its citizens will be
needed to prevent more Lal Masjids from creating their own shariah squads.
Pampering Fanatics – Why?
The changes in Islamabad, while surprising, nevertheless betray an unmistakeable
continuity. Military generals and fanatical clerics have been symbiotically
linked in Pakistan’s politics for decades. They have often needed and helped the
other attain their respective goals. And it is possible that they may soon need
each other again – this time to set Islamabad ablaze.
Why so? Beset by nation-wide protests against his dismissal of the chief justice
of Pakistan, Musharraf is now a desperate man willing to use all available
means, including extremists of all kinds, to help him survive the challenge to
his rule. After he gave the green light to the Muttaheda Qaumi Mahaz (MQM), an
ethno-fascist political party that supports him, it initiated a horrific carnage
on May 12, 2007 that led to the death of dozens of protesters.
Given this background, a plausible explanation emerges for allowing the rampage
to continue through Islamabad for months: the Lal Masjid extremist monster, and
others like it around the country, are certain to grow too big and will then
need to be killed. No force except for the Pakistan Army can conceivably do
this. An engineered bloodbath that leads to the army’s intervention, and the
declaration of a national emergency, could serve as excellent reason for
postponing the October 2007 elections. Although Musharraf denies that he wants a
postponement, a lengthy martial law may now be his only chance for a
continuation of his dictatorial rule into its eighth year – and perhaps beyond.
This perverse strategy sounds almost unbelievable. A man who President George W.
Bush describes as his “buddy” in the war against terror, and the celebrated
author of an “enlightened moderate” version of Islam, Musharraf wears the two
close assassination attempts on his life by religious extremists as a badge of
honour. During his roaring three-week visit [to the US] in September 2006, he
received standing ovations from audiences at, among others, the Council for
Foreign Relations and Columbia University. He appeared before a comedy
television show, and took an entourage of 70 loyal followers for a lavish tour
around the US to promote his memoir, “In the Line of Fire”.
An obviously secular general with aspirations to international stature for
advocating a peaceful Islam would, it seems, have no truck with extremists. But
Musharraf has long been accused of leading a double life. Indeed, his secret
reliance upon the Taliban card – one that he has been accused of playing for
years – increases as his authority and judgment weakens. But is he actually
complicit in allowing religious terrorism to spread? Or merely weak and
confused? In the following we shall inspect Musharraf’s much publicized
“enlightened moderation” in order to judge the level of commitment behind his
agenda of social reform.
Enlightened Moderation – The Track Record
No one doubts that there have been some changes for the good. There is a
perceptible shift in institutional practices and inclinations. Heads of
government organizations are no longer required to lead noon prayers as in the
1980’s; female announcers with undraped heads freely appear on Pakistan
Television; to the relief of many passengers thickly bearded stewards are
disappearing from PIA flights; the first women fighter pilots have been inducted
into the Pakistan Air Force; although it exercises great self-censorship the
media is allowed to discuss some controversial issues; and criticism of the
government (but not the army) is permitted in small doses. A vastly overdue –
but nevertheless welcome – action was taken by the government when it released
in July 2006 hundreds of women prisoners arrested under the Hudood Ordinance for
fornication, many of whom had spent years awaiting their trial.
But the force of these pluses cannot outweigh the many more weighty minuses, nor
suppress the rising tide of religious fanaticism across the length and breadth
of Pakistan. Secretly encouraging radicalism, while routinely denying that it is
doing so, has been a consistent feature of the Establishment’s practice.
Jihadist groups have long operated with the state’s knowledge and support. Many
such groups, trained and armed by the Pakistan Army for over two decades, had
been formally banned under pressure from the US. But only hours after the killer
October 2005 earthquake, members of extremist groups in Kashmir – which had
officially ceased to exist after the General’s famous speech of 12 January, 2002
– were pulling people out from under the rubble and taking them to their own
hospitals. They earned gratitude all around for their relief work, and this
enabled the jihadists to fully reestablish and even expand the scale of their
organizations. On the other hand, the Pakistan Army – for all its heavy presence
in the area – was nowhere to be seen for days. Jihadist groups continued to
openly flaunt their banners and weapons in all major towns of Azad Kashmir.
Hafiz Saeed, the head of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and its post-ban reincarnation,
Jamat-ud-Dawa, demanded that the government hand over all relief
responsibilities to his group since they were doing a much better job. Indeed,
some extremist groups obtained relief materials from government stocks to pass
off as their own, and used heavy vehicles that could only have been provided by
the authorities. Many national and international relief organizations were left
insecure by their overwhelming presence. It took over many months for the
jihadists to move out of full public view into more sheltered places.
Although he has been decorated as an SSG commando for combat bravery, General
Musharraf’s courage consistently fails when it comes to confronting mullahs. On
21st April 2000, Musharraf had announced a new administrative procedure for
registration of cases under the Blasphemy Law 295-C. This law, under which the
minimum penalty is death, has frequently been used to harass personal and
political opponents. To reduce such occurrences, Musharraf’s modified procedure
would have required authorization from the local district magistrate for
registration of a blasphemy case. It would have been an improvement, albeit a
modest one. But 25 days later – on the 16th of May 2000 – under the watchful
glare of the mullahs, Musharraf hastily climbed down: “As it was the unanimous
demand of the ulema, mashaikh and the people, therefore, I have decided to do
away with the procedural change in the registration of FIR under the Blasphemy
Law”.4
Musharraf’s courage again failed in October 2004, just as a new system for
issuing machine readable passports was being installed. In keeping with
international practices, the government had declared that henceforth it would
not be necessary for passport holders to specify their religion. Expectedly this
was denounced by the Islamic parties as a grand conspiracy aimed at secularizing
Pakistan and destroying its Islamic character. But even before the mullahs
actually took to the streets, the government lost nerve and the volte-face was
announced on 24 March, 2005. Information Minister Sheikh Rashid said the
decision to revive the religion column was made else, “Qadianis and other
apostates would be able to pose as Muslims and perform pilgrimage in Saudi
Arabia”.5
Targeting Pakistani Women
The freedom available to women in Pakistan has steadily shrunk over time,
including the period of Musharraf’s rule. His attitudes on rape victims have
outraged many women. On Musharraf’s orders, a gang-rape victim from Meerwalla
village, Mukhtaran Mai, was disallowed from proceeding overseas lest she bring a
bad name to Pakistan. Another rape victim, a woman doctor who described her
assailant as an army officer, received harsh treatment from Musharraf who, in an
interview to the Washington Post, dismissed her case by remarking: “A lot of
people say if you want to go abroad and get a visa for Canada or citizenship and
be a millionaire, get yourself raped.6”
Such attitudes towards women are typical of soldiers in a macho culture. It took
a long struggle by the feminist movements across the world to counter them, and
success has only been partial. But the Islamist agenda is different: it seeks
total separation of the sexes, and to diminish the space for women in public
life. This central goal is being efficiently and successfully pursued.
The consequences are sometimes catastrophic. For example, on April 9, 2006, 21
women and 8 children were crushed to death, and scores injured, in a stampede
inside a three-storey madrassa in Karachi where a large number of women had
gathered for a weekly congregation. Male rescuers, who arrived in ambulances,
were prevented from moving injured women to hospitals.
One cannot dismiss this as just one incident. Soon after the October 2005
earthquake, as I walked through the destroyed city of Balakot, a student of the
Frontier Medical College described to me how he and his male colleagues were
stopped by religious elders from digging out injured girl students from under
the rubble of their school building. The action of these elders was similar to
that of Saudi Arabia’s ubiquitous religious “mutaween” police who, in March
2002, had stopped schoolgirls from leaving a blazing building because they were
not properly covered up. In rare criticism, Saudi newspapers had blamed the
mutaween for letting 15 girls burn to death.
Female nurses looking after male patients at hospitals in NWFP may soon be
banned. Pakistani health minister, Mohammad Nasir Khan, has assured the upper
house of parliament that the government could consider the request
sympathetically. This move arose from a motion moved by female parliamentary
members of the MMA, the Islamist party that commands majorities in the
provincial assemblies of the Frontier and Baluchistan provinces and offered
crucial support for Musharraf staying on as president. Women’s bodies are of
particular concern to these holy men: “We think that men could derive sexual
pleasure from women’s bodies while conducting ECG or ultrasound,7” proclaimed
Maulana Gul Naseeb Khan, provincial secretary of the MMA. In his opinion women
would be able to lure men under the pretext of these medical procedures.
Therefore, he said, “to save the supreme values of Islam and the message of the
Holy Prophet (PBUH), the MMA has decided to impose the ban.8”
A once-vibrant Pakistani culture is turning dull and drab. The drive to
segregate is now also being found among educated women. Vigorous proselytizers
bringing this message, such as Mrs. Farhat Hashmi, have been catapulted to
heights of fame and fortune. As the country trades its South Asian identity for
an Arab one, the Saudi abaya, a drab cloak almost unknown and unheard off in
Pakistan until a few years ago, is now ubiquitous. Billboards with women’s faces
have disappeared from cities of the NWFP because the MMA deems the exhibition of
unveiled women as un-Islamic.
Leaders Pandering To Extremism
Hoping that it will add to their respectability and popularity, Pakistani
political leaders other than General Musharraf, also with secular credentials,
have jumped on the religion bandwagon. Shaukat Aziz, a former Citibanker and now
prime minister of Pakistan, has made calls for nation-wide prayers for rain in
years of drought. This effort to improve his Islamic standing became less
laughable when, at an education conference in Islamabad, he proposed that
religious education must start as soon as children enter school9. Aziz countered
a suggestion by the moderate Islamic scholar, Javed Ghamdi, that only school
children in their fifth year and above should be given formal Islamic education.
Otherwise, said Ghamdi, they would stand in danger of becoming rigid and
doctrinaire. The government’s new education policy now requires Islamic studies
to begin in the third year of school, a year earlier than in the previous
policy.
Other ministers are no less determined to show their Islamic zeal. The federal
minister for religious affairs, Ijaz ul Haq (Zia-ul-Haq’s son), speaking at the
launch of a book authored by a leading Islamic extremist leader on “Christian
Terrorism and The Muslim World,” argued that anyone who did not believe in jihad
was neither a Muslim nor a Pakistani. He then declared that given the situation
facing Muslims today, he was prepared to be a suicide bomber.
The clearest political expression of the shift towards a more violent and
intolerant Islam is the rise of the MMA as a national force which on key issues
both supports and is supported by General Musharraf’s government. A measure of
its power, and the threat it poses to society and the state, is the Pakistani
Taliban movement that it has helped create, especially in the tribal areas
bordering Afghanistan. Their success draws in large measure on the lessons they
learned when working hand in the hand with the Pakistan army to create and
sustain the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Talibanization Of Tribal Areas
Unable to combat the toxic mix of religion with tribalism, the Pakistani
government has lost whatever administrative authority it once had. Under US
pressure, the army had been mounting military offensives against Al-Qaeda and
Taliban fighters who fled Afghanistan. Its assaults have taken a heavy civilian
toll and local resistance has grown in many areas, particularly in North
Waziristan.
A bit of history: In 2002, presumably on Washington’s instructions, the Pakistan
Army established military bases in South Waziristan. This had become a refuge
for Taliban and Al Qaeda fleeing Afghanistan. Combat soon followed, with the
army making extensive use of artillery and US-supplied Cobra gunships. By 2005
heavy fighting had spread to North Waziristan. Even though soldiers rarely
ventured out from guard posts and heavy fortifications, the Army was taking
losses whose extent has never been revealed. The senior army leadership, safely
removed from combat areas, officially ascribed the resistance to “a few hundred
foreign militants and terrorists”. But morale continued to sink, with junior
army men wondering why they were being asked to attack their ideological
comrades – the Taliban. Reportedly, local clerics refused to conduct funeral
prayers for soldiers killed in action.
The half-hearted war, fought at the behest of a foreign power, failed. It led to
the signing of a “peace treaty” on 1 September, 2006 in the town of Miramshah –
which is now firmly in the grip of the Pakistani Taliban. Army officers, and the
militants they had fought for 4 years, hugged each other while heavily armed,
bearded, Taliban stood guard. Although the military governor of the province,
Lt.Gen. Ali Mohammad Aurakzai, praised the peace agreement as “unprecedented in
tribal history”, in fact it has a precedent in the 2004 Shakai agreement in
South Waziristan, which had made the militants immensely stronger. The Miramshah
treaty was blessed – and reportedly engineered – by Maulana Fazlur Rehman who
(quite falsely) claims to be the father of the Taliban.
The Miramshah treaty met all demands made by the militants: the release of all
jailed militants; dismantling of army checkpoints; return of seized weapons and
vehicles; the right of the Taliban to display weapons (except heavy ones); and
residence rights for fellow fighters from other Islamic countries. As for
“foreign militants” – who Musharraf had blamed exclusively for the resistance,
the militants were nonchalant: we will let you know if we find any! The
financial compensation demanded by the Taliban for loss of property and life has
not been revealed, but some officials have remarked that it is “astronomical”.
In turn they promised to cease their attacks on civil and military
installations, and give the army a safe passage out.
Washington and London cautiously welcomed Musharraf’s “peace treaty”, an
indication of how well he had refined his persuasive powers for the West. It was
also an admission of how matters had slipped out of control.
As Musharraf has now been forced to admit, the fact is that the local Taliban,
as well as Al-Qaida, are popular and the army is not. In the tribal areas, the
local Taliban now run a parallel administration that dispenses primitive justice
according to tribal and Islamic principles. A widely available Taliban-made
video that I saw showed the bodies of common criminals and bandits dangling from
electricity poles in the town of Miramshah while thousands of appreciative
spectators look on. A Pathan barber, who migrated to Islamabad from Wana, a
regional capital, told me that many others like him are making their way to the
big cities or abandoning their traditional occupation. Traditional musicians
have also abandoned their professions.
The Pakistani Taliban (like their brothers in Afghanistan) view education as
insidious. Pakistani newspapers frequently carry news of schools in the tribal
regions being attacked destroyed by the Taliban. But rarely are these incidents
followed by angry editorials or letters-to-the editor. Implicit sympathy for the
Taliban remains strong among urban middle-class Pakistanis because they are
perceived as standing up to the Americans, while the government has caved in.
Some argue that the army had no choice but to surrender in Waziristan. After
all, on the other side of the Pak-Afghan border even the combined might of Nato
and US forces have proved insufficient against the resurgent Taliban. So how
could the Pakistani army ever win? But this hides the fact that the army’s high
command demonstrated appallingly bad judgment and strategy by venturing into
terrain where guerrilla warfare is extremely effective. It was far better not to
have engaged in combat, than to fight and lose. One feels that an intelligent
use of force combined with traditional tribal diplomacy would not have led to
such a humiliating capitulation.
Evidences Of The Overall Islamic Shift
Survey statistics make the Islamist shift underway in Pakistan yet more evident
and quantitative. According to the Pew Global Survey (2006), the percentage of
Pakistanis who expressed confidence in Osama bin Laden as a world leader grew
from 45% in 2003 to 51% in 2005. This 6 point increase must be compared against
responses to an identical questionnaire in Morocco, Turkey, and Lebanon, where
bin Laden’s popularity has sharply dropped by as much as 20 points10.
Support for the Sharia is also rising. A survey by the World Public Opinion.Org
(April 24, 2007) found that 54% of Pakistanis wanted strict application of
Sharia while 25% wanted it in some more dilute form. Totaling 79%, this was the
largest percentage in the four countries surveyed (Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan,
Indonesia)11.
It is worth asking what has changed Pakistan so and what makes it so different
from other Muslim countries? What has set one section of its people upon the
other, created notions of morality centred on separating the sexes, and sapped
the country’s vitality? Some well meaning Pakistanis – particularly those in the
diaspora – think that it is best to avoid such difficult questions. In seeking
to “repackage Pakistan” for the media and change negative perceptions of
Pakistan in the West, they hesitate to call for a change in the structure of the
state and its outlook.
But at the heart of Pakistan’s problems lies a truth – one etched in stone –
that when a state proclaims a religious identity and mission, it is bound to
privilege those who organize religious life and interpret religious text. Since
there are many models and interpretations within every religion, there is bound
to be conflict between religious forces over whose model shall prevail. There is
also the larger confrontation between religious principles and practices and
what we now consider to be ‘modern’ ideas of society, which have emerged over
the past several hundred years. This truth, for all its simplicity, escaped the
attention of several generations of soldiers, politicians, and citizens of
Pakistan.
It is true that there has been some learning – Musharraf’s call for “enlightened
moderation” is a tacit (and welcome) admission that a theocratic Pakistan cannot
work. But his call conflicts with his other, more important, responsibility as
chief of the Pakistan Army which had consciously nurtured radicalism in previous
decades.
The relationship between the army and religious radicals is today no longer as
simple as in the 1980’s. To maintain a positive image in the West, the Pakistani
establishment must continue to decry Islamic radicalism, and display elements of
liberalism that are deeply disliked by the orthodox. But hard actions will be
taken only if the Islamists threaten the army’s corporate and political
interests, or if senior army commanders are targeted for assassination. The
Islamists for their part hope for, and seek to incite, action by zealous
officers to bring back the glory days of the military-mullah alliance led by
General Zia ul Haq.
Musharraf and his corps commanders well know that they cannot afford to sleep
too well. It is in the lower ranks that the Islamists are busily establishing
bases. A mass of junior officers and low-ranking soldiers – whose world view is
similar to that of the Taliban in most respects – feels resentful of being used
as cannon fodder for fighting America’s “war on terror”. It is they who die, not
their senior officers. So far, army discipline has successfully squelched
dissent and forced it underground. But this sleeping giant can – if and when it
wakes up – tear asunder the Pakistan Army, and shake the Pakistani state from
its very foundations.
Is Radical Islam Inevitable?
With the large and growing popular sentiment against Musharraf and his army, one
cannot rule out the possibility that in the years ahead nuclear armed Pakistan
may fall under a neo-Taliban style Salafi-Wahabi-Deobandi leadership allied with
conservative senior military leaders. If it does, then Pakistan could become the
world’s most dangerous state. But, although possible, it is certainly not
inevitable – countervailing forces work against this nightmare scenario.
First, the Pakistani Establishment does not want extreme Islam – at least not
yet. This oligarchy, which runs Pakistan by tacit consent, draws its membership
from the military, the powerful feudal and landed class, and sections of the
civil elite. It is a beneficiary of the status quo and presently has no desire
to change it. Even if religion is a potent way of controlling the masses, the
de-facto rulers who constitute the Establishment realize that too much of it can
end up cramping their own personal liberties. Moreover, being linked to foreign
aid and a globalizing world, they would suffer penalties imposed by the West if
Pakistan were to Talibanize. Most, if not all, have their children studying in
the West or international business interests.
Within the Establishment, the Pakistan Army has gained the most – and would like
to see that it stays this way. As an institution it has acquired enormous
corporate interests that sprawl across real estate, manufacturing, and service
sectors. It also receives large amounts of military aid, all of which would be
threatened if it comes into direct conflict with the US. In the 1960s and 1980s,
and again since 9/11, the army discovered its high rental value when serving the
US. Although the long-term costs to the society and state have been terrible,
the Army has steadily increased its power and assets.
A second impediment to radical Islam is that religious leaders are not very
successful at getting votes or getting a high national stature. This makes
Pakistan very different from Iran. Historically, Pakistan’s religious-political
parties have fared poorly in electoral politics because of the many sectarian
divides, narrow agendas that are irrelevant to the larger concerns of the
country, poor organizational infrastructure (Jamaat-e-Islami excluded), and the
lack of a well-educated and charismatic leadership. The success enjoyed by the
MMA in NWFP and Baluchistan owed largely to the special situation created by the
invasion of Afghanistan, and then Iraq, as well as the support received from the
military establishment. While they use the Islamic idiom, Pakistan’s urban
middle class is fairly sophisticated and resents radical Islamism.
Traditionally, the Pathan mullah has had low social status and been the target
of ridicule. Therefore, at a national level, the mainstream political parties
are likely to have a clear lead over any religious-political party or even a
coalition of such parties.
Thirdly, access to national and global television brings a level of
sophistication in the popular culture. Images of the outside world, and open
discussions on issues of contemporary importance, have created a public space
that offers alternatives to the extreme radicalization offered by the mullahs.
Of course, television cuts both ways because its power is also appreciated and
used by radicals. On balance, however, the forces of globalization and open
global communication do bring modern ideas and attitudes into society.
To conclude: It is an open question as to exactly how much further Pakistan will
move towards religious radicalism in the years to come. There are many
imponderables that will determine the pace: the expected moderation in US
foreign policy after George W. Bush in regard to the Muslim world; the direction
taken by the war in Afghanistan as well as Iraq; the outcome of current
negotiations with India over Kashmir; whether the Baluchistan conflict is
allowed to simmer as presently or brought to some resolution; and the future
state of the economy and social services. It is a rather safe prediction,
however, that the end of 2007 will see a continuation of the civil-military
alliance that has dominated Pakistani politics for decades, and that the
interests of this alliance will determine how far it can go towards meeting the
radical threat. It is also virtually certain that the social forces set into
motion over the years through the education system will make most of Pakistani
society – barring pockets of liberalism in the upper crust of society – more
conservative and orthodox relative to the previous generation.
References:
2 Editorial, The News, Islamabad, April 24, 2007.
3 Ibid.
4 General Pervez Musharraf, press conference, 16 May 2000, Islamabad.
5Jang, Islamabad-Lahore-Karachi, 25 March 2005. Also
Newsreport - March, 2005
6 BBC News,
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Outrage at Musharraf rape
remarks
7 MMA bans ultrasound, ECG scanning of women by male technicians, Sept 21, 2003,
The Friday Times, Lahore, Mohammad Shehzad.
8 Ibid
9 The Daily Times editorial, Saturday, June 03, 2006.
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
%5Cstory_3-6-2006_pg3_1
10 Pew Global Attitudes Project Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and
Western Publics.
Pew Global Attitudes Project: Summary of Findings:
Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics
11 World Public Opinion.Org , “Muslims Believe US Seeks to Undermine Islam”,
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pi...les/brmiddleea
stnafricara/346.php?nid=&id=&pnt=346
http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/science-tech/40641-science-islamic-world-quest-rapprochement.html
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