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Tactical Hudna and
Islamist Intolerance by Denis MacEoin The use by Westerners of the
word hudna highlights an anomaly. Whenever journalists, diplomats, or
commentators covering the Middle East use a non-English word, it will almost
always be Arabic or perhaps Persian; seldom do they use any Hebrew words. Never
has a U.S. or British newspaper, for example, used the Hebrew word for
cease-fire (hafsakat esh). This is odd as Israel is the other side to
these cease-fires. The majority of Arabic terms reproduced in Western language
newspapers are concerned with either military topics (jihad, mujahideen,
fida'iyin, shahid)[1] or religious affairs (fatwa, mulla,
ulema, ayatollah, Shari‘a, Allahu akbar).[2] There is nothing wrong with borrowing
Arabic words. However, doing so without understanding the word's nuance and
historical development will render deficient any understanding of that word's
true meaning. Here, it might be possible to
consider hudna somewhat of an exception—it can be translated accurately
as truce or cease-fire. Its contemporary usage — at least in English and other
European languages — is exclusive to the conflict between Israel and its
adversaries, whether Islamist terror groups in Gaza, the West Bank, or southern
Lebanon, or states such as Syria. In Iran, it is used alongside the Persian
term aramesh.[3] Still, hudna retains a historical
context that colors its meaning, if not in Western papers, then in Arabs'
understanding. The concept of hudna
deserves a close look: It is not a Qur'anic term, nor is it the only Arabic
word for a cease-fire or truce; others include: muhadana, muwada'a, muhla,
musalaha, musalama, mutaraka, and sulh. But hudna is the most
prominent. It is the first word used in Muslim history to mean cease-fire,
specifically in the context of the seventh century Truce or Treaty of
al-Hudaybiyya, often termed the Sulh al-Hudaybiyya (peace of al-Hudaybiyya). Named after a village outside
Mecca, the truce came six years after Muhammad and his followers abandoned
Mecca for Yathrib, today's Medina. This move, known as the hijra
(emigration) is of enormous significance for the classical understanding of
jihad, inasmuch as it sets a pattern of retreat followed by regrouping and
rearming, which permits an attack on the territory previously left behind.[4] In March 628 C.E., Muhammad and his
followers sought to return to Mecca to perform a pilgrimage. At Hudaybiyya,
Muhammad "marched till he reached al-Hudaybiyya which lies at the limit of
the Haram [sacred territory of Mecca] area at a distance of nine miles from Mecca."[5] Muhammad and the rulers of Mecca, most of
whom had yet to convert to Islam, negotiated a truce, the essence of which was
to permit the Muslims to return unarmed on pilgrimage each year for the next
decade. It came to an end two years later, however, following an infraction by
a tribe allied to the Meccans. In 630, Muhammad entered Mecca with a small,
armed force and took the city peacefully. Hudna, in other words,
amounted to a temporary truce. Today, radical groups and
conventional Muslims alike often use the term hudna when they divide
areas not controlled by Islamists into a realm of Islam (dar al-Islam)
and a realm of war (dar al-harb),[6] or pagan ignorance (jahiliyya).
The leading exponent of this latter concept was Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
ideologue Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) who, in his 1964 treatise, Ma'alim fi
‘l-tariq (Milestones), wrote: Lastly, all the existing
so-called "Muslim" societies are also jahili societies. We
classify them among jahili societies not because they believe in other
deities besides God or because they worship anyone other than God, but because
their way of life is not based on submission to God alone. Although they
believe in the unity of God, still they have relegated the legislative
attribute of God to others and submit to this authority, and from this
authority they derive their systems, their traditions and customs, their laws,
their values and standards, and almost every practice of life.[7] For Qutb's fellow travelers and
intellectual successors, Muslim countries that are not theocracies—any state
except Iran, Saudi Arabia to a limited degree, or Sudan—are treated as though
they had reverted to paganism. Fear of Fitna Over the course of history, hudna
became the standard term to describe a cessation of hostilities during jihad.
Muslims distinguished the hudna from other forms of disengagement, such
as those applied to tribal feuds, clashes between city factions, rebellions
against the monarch or his provincial governors, or fitna, sedition or
civil strife. Fitna was the greatest fear of classical Muslim society,
which aspired above all things for perfect order both under a caliph or sultan
and under religious law as mediated by the ulema or religious scholars, and,
more narrowly, the fuqaha or jurisprudents.[8] By being unaware of fitna,
most journalists ignore something vital to the course of Islamic civilization
and the development of Islamic thought. For all the greatness of their
architecture, scholarship, and literature, traditional Islamic societies were
prey to disintegration. Muslim societies lacked the stability of China. Western
societies overcame such tensions by creating nation-states. This did not mean
that either Chinese power or European states remained constant over time, only
that they were remarkably stable when compared to Muslim dynasties—at least
those that arose before gunpowder enabled leaders to retain control through
sheer force. In practice, a unitary Islamic
empire ruled by a single caliph lasted for only a short time. When Muhammad
died in 632, he was succeeded by the first of four "rightly guided"
caliphs. Together, these men ruled the state of Islam for about thirty years
although only one died peacefully in his bed. Fitna began during the reign of the fourth caliph, ‘Ali,
regarded by the Shi‘a as the first of their twelve imams. But more than
religious divisions split the Islamic world. Upon ‘Ali's death, the caliphate
passed to the Damascus-based Umayyad dynasty (661-750), then to the Abbasids
(750-1258) who built a new capital in Baghdad. As the Abbasid caliphate
weakened, minor dynasties rose to dominate regionally throughout the greater
Islamic empire. The caliph may have remained the nominal overlord but, in practice,
he had little power. Abbasid rule—and, in some ways,
the caliphate itself—came to an end when a Mongol army killed the last caliph
and sacked much of the imperial city. But, since the tenth century, the empire
had suffered factionalism and the rise of new dynasties paying only symbolic
allegiance to the caliph in Baghdad. The Mongol attack ended even the illusion
of unitary rule, and led to a steady flux and reflux of dynasties. Competing
armies made life insecure in many parts of the Islamic heartland. The Ottoman
revival of the caliphate was more symbolic than actual; the caliphate—which
Atatürk abolished in 1924—never again approached the power of the sultans or
regional leaders. These smaller Islamic polities
were in constant flux, leading to regular episodes of fitna and a need
to establish truces between warring parties, which generally recognized one
another as Muslims. This phenomenon was famously identified and studied by the
fourteenth-century Muslim sociologist, Ibn Khaldun, who argued that a cohesive
society became weak through decadence, eventually allowing its conquest at the
hands of barbarians, who in their new position would grow civilized, only to
become weak in due course themselves.[9] The late economic historian Charles
Issawi and University of Kentucky philosophy professor Oliver Leaman summarize
Ibn Khaldun's argument: Ibn Khaldun sees the historical
process as one of constant cyclical change, due mainly to the interaction of
two groups, nomads and townspeople. These form the two poles of his mental map;
peasants are in between, supplying the towns with food and tax revenue and
taking handicrafts in return. Nomads are rough, savage and uncultured, and
their presence is always inimical to civilization; however, they are hardy,
frugal, uncorrupted in morals, freedom-loving and self-reliant, and so make
excellent fighters. In addition, they have a strong sense of ‘asabiya,
which can be translated as "group cohesion" or "social
solidarity." This greatly enhances their military potential. Towns, by
contrast, are the seats of the crafts, the sciences, the arts, and culture. Yet
luxury corrupts them, and as a result they become a liability to the state,
like women and children who need to be protected. Solidarity is completely
relaxed and the arts of defending oneself and of attacking the enemy are
forgotten, so they are no match for conquering nomads.[10] Ibn Khaldun's observations were
accurate, but they were not what Muslim clerics and statesmen wanted to hear.
For them, the ideal of a single umma (the international community of
believers) remained an essential guide to how the world was supposed to work.
God perfected His religion in Islam, and therefore, it was logical that Muslims
would progress steadily through to the end of time. Progress would occur
externally through conquest and conversion, often through trade and preaching,
while internally, Islam would enjoy consolidation. The notion of the rise and
fall of Islamic states was disturbing to Muslims: How could men speak of a
single umma when Islamic lands were divided into multiple polities? And,
in the absence of a unitary state, where was the religio-political order that
Muhammad had created? Such perfection could not be
achieved so long as Muslim states fought Muslim states. A single, recognized
authority for the realm of Islam was necessary to counter such divisiveness. It
is significant that the only major schism to divide Muslims, the rift between
Sunnis and Shi‘a, began, not over a theological point, but rather over an
argument as to who was the true leader of the faith. The House
of Islam Particularly for those on the
fringes of the realm of Islam, one of the principal ways in which the Islamic
state was able to assert its sense of strength and ever-advancing rule was by
waging jihad. Jurists agreed that the caliph or another legitimate ruler
authorized by the caliph should raid contiguous non-Muslim territory once a
year in order to convert unbelievers or force their submission. Numerous jihad
states came into being, their existence justified only by their undertaking of
the communal duty to fight unbelievers. Should a Muslim victory seem
remote, the caliph could declare a truce in the interests of the umma.
Rudolph Peters, Islamic law professor at the University of Amsterdam states,
"According to some schools of law, a truce must be concluded for a
specified period of time, no longer than ten years."[11] Hanafi law, however, permits the Muslims
to terminate a truce arbitrarily: The "imam may denounce the armistice
whenever the continuation of warfare is more favorable for the Moslems than the
continuation of peace," he continues.[12] Such a truce is necessary when the
Muslims are weak relative to their enemies. It can also occur when there is fitna
within an Islamic state.[13] These truces serve as protection against
further violence to enable Muslims to regroup and gather their strength,
whereupon they can issue a fresh declaration of jihad. Such a treaty is a hudna,
distinct from sulh where the non-Muslim state pays tribute to a more
powerful Muslim one, or an ‘ahd, a covenant of security, in which
protection for Muslims is reciprocated.[14] Many Westerners still find it
hard to grasp the fact that Islam is not a religion in either the
Judeo-Christian or Far Eastern sense. Because Islam draws so heavily on Jewish
and Christian personalities and norms, it can be easy to miss the extra
dimension it possesses. The philosopher and social anthropologist Ernest
Gellner (d. 1995) explained: Islam is the blueprint of a
social order. It holds that a set of rules exists, eternal, divinely ordained,
and independent of the will of man, which defines the proper ordering of
society. … These rules are to be implemented throughout social life.[15] It is a highly prescriptive
religion in which church and state are never wholly separated. Rabbinical
Judaism is a similarly prescriptive and legalistic faith but, until the
creation of the state of Israel, had no bearing on any post-classical state.
And since the nineteenth century, Judaism has produced movements (Conservative,
Reform, and even humanistic) consciously responsive to the changing needs of
modern society, something Islam has yet to do. For pious Muslims, Muhammad did
not just bring a message for the salvation of men's souls but also a call (da'wa,
proselytizing for Islam)[16] for the creation of a divine society on
earth. To the extent that Islam offers salvation, it has to come through the
act of conversion—but whether voluntary or forced makes no difference. By
virtue of reciting the profession of faith ("I bear witness that there is
no god but God, I bear witness that Muhammad is the Messenger of God"),
the convert is saved from death and is guaranteed a place in paradise. The term
islam itself means "submission" and applies both to the
individual's submitting to God and a society's acceptance of conquest by Muslim
armies. Thus, the dar al-Islam (the realm of submission) signifies
territory ruled (or once ruled) by Muslims while territory ruled by unbelievers
is dar al-Harb (the realm of war) although some jurists hold that
territory under the rule of unbelievers may be treated as dar al-Islam
if the infidels allow Muslims to worship freely and perform other religious
duties. The salvific community is,
strictly speaking, the Islamic umma, an overarching nation whose
membership depends not on nationality, language, race, or tribe but only on
faith. Jews and Christians who have refused to convert but have accepted the
role of dhimmis, protected but restricted peoples, live and work within
the umma but are not members of it. Unlike immigrants into modern
Western states who acquire citizenship after a certain number of years, dhimmis
can only become full citizens of an Islamic state by converting. Thus, the
Baha'is in Iran and Egypt, the Ahmadis in Pakistan, and Christians throughout
much of the region remain second-class citizens and are citizens of the
nation-state alone. In Egypt, until 2008, even native-born Baha'is were unable
to obtain identification cards that would allow them to access a wide range of
public services, including health care and education.[17] The expulsion of Jews from all Arab
countries after 1948 was prompted by religious considerations, given that those
expelled were not Israelis, and the countries involved had suffered no
territorial loss. Perceived from the perspective of the European Westphalian
state system, the establishment of Israel was a legal outcome of the
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of a group of short-term
mandates, but throughout the Islamic world, it has been perceived as a lesion
because it damages the umma. All societies have a
"Golden Age," a time when a just ruler presided over happy and
prosperous subjects, when the weather was always fair and peace assured. Some
religions dream of a future age when heaven is reflected on earth. Islam is no
exception, but its chief framework for such visions is the umma and the
belief that Islam will one day conquer the world. However it happens, such a
conquest will lead to the normalization of the world within Islam. This is apparent in a
contemporary interview with Ayat Allah Kamil, a young Palestinian woman who had
tried to carry out a suicide bombing. Her Israeli interviewer asked, "Do
you have any dreams for the future?" She responded, "Of the world
becoming Islamic, a world in which we will all live in peace, joy, and harmony,
all of us, human beings, animals, flowers, plants, and stones. Islam will even
bring peace to vegetables and animals, the grass and the stones ... And you'll
be able to remain Jewish, whatever you want; it doesn't matter but in an
Islamic world."[18] This extraordinary—and
sad—expression of faith shows how real it is for Muslims to believe in Islam,
not just as something in their hearts, but as a universalist, unifying
presence. The problem is that this unification of the spiritual and social
realms does not happen in practice. Ibn Khaldun explained this better than
anyone before or since. After discussing the cyclical nature of the rise and
fall of states, he opined on the importance of religion. Issawi and Leaman
explain, Religion can influence the
nature of such a model; when ‘asabiya is reinforced by religion, its
strength is multiplied, and great empires can be founded. Religion can also
reinforce the cohesion of an established state. Yet the endless cycle of
flowering and decay shows no evolution or progress except for that from the
primitive to civilized society.[19] What Went
Wrong? In the modern period, these
disparate strands come together in a special way that makes this the most
critical epoch in Muslim history. By the eighteenth century, if not earlier,
Muslims were no longer among the most powerful peoples. In the twentieth
century, almost all the old Muslim assumptions about mankind's direction were
abolished. Most Muslim countries passed under Christian control, a direct
contradiction to the doctrine of Islamic supremacy. By the end of World War I, not
only had the last Islamic empire dissolved, but a hodgepodge of new
nation-states replaced it. This contradicted the principle of a single umma
and made the execution of any form of defensive jihad against the conquerors
difficult. There was no single leader to unite all Muslims to combat the
infidel. The kings and presidents who took the mantle of the new states and
owed their thrones to Western intervention had no wish, let alone the ability,
to carry out jihad. This led to tension between
Islam and the nation-state. New rulers in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere
demanded allegiance to the state before religion. Prior to this, the idea of a
traitor to the nation-state was meaningless. According to Christine
Schirrmacher, academic director of the Islamic Studies Institute in Bonn: Since apostasy in Islam is not
merely a private or ecclesiastical affair (by withdrawal of church membership,
for example) as it is in Western society, the state must act. Apostasy is
treason towards Moslem society (the "Umma") and the undermining of
the Moslem state, for Islam is the buttress of society and the state itself.
Apostasy erodes and shakes the foundations of the order of society—because it
is treason, the state must prosecute it.[20] This rankled the pious. To
become the ally of a Christian power contradicted everything for which Islam
stood. If Christians were allies, impregnable, or in a long-term treaty
relationship, what would happen to the doctrine and practice of jihad? What
would happen to the mission of making the entire globe one Islamic entity? In
this context, the establishment of Israel rankled. The long-despised Jews not
only had a national home but one built on land that Muslims considered to
"belong" to Islam since the Arab conquests of the seventh century.
Against such an abomination, jihad could be the only solution. Attitudes had evolved over
time. During the 1930s, Palestinian Arabs under the leadership of the Hajj Amin
al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, had embraced a great deal of Nazi
ideology.[21] Many Arabs still take inspiration from
the Third Reich, and Arab speech and iconography have borrowed heavily from
European anti-Semitism. The Jew became the hook-nosed subject of Der Stürmer
newspaper and Nazi propaganda films. He became a master conspirator working on
the orders of a secret cabal, a myth imported from Russia and still widely
disseminated in bestselling Arabic translations of the literary fraud The
Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Recent pictures show Hezbollah fighters,
Fatah members, and Palestinian Authority policemen using the Nazi salute. However, this acquired
anti-Semitism creates numerous problems for Arab anti-Zionists. Western
anti-Semitism is racist; not even a Jew who had abandoned his faith or
converted to Christianity was spared by Hitler's racist doctrine of the Jew as üntermensch.
Whereas a Jew under Islam had the options of conversion or life as a dhimmi,
a Jew in German-occupied Europe had no choice at all. Once Israel was
established, Arabs became anti-Semites and called not only for the
extermination of Israel but also for the annihilation of all Jews living there.
This has made the possibility of a truce even more remote since it has an
all-or-nothing quality similar to Hitler's "Final Solution." In addition, Muslims had to
contend with more than the military power of Europeans. The Christians and,
later, the Jews, had advanced materially, intellectually, and politically. They
had parliaments, constitutional monarchies, republics, a free press, countless
inventions, the ability to travel the globe at increasing speeds, universities,
technological colleges, effective medicine, science, and women who played a
role in public life. This disparity is well
demonstrated by the immense gap that has opened up between Muslim and Jewish
achievements in the arts and sciences. Jews, with a worldwide population of
13.3 million, have garnered no fewer than 164 Nobel prizes; Muslims, on the
other hand, with a population of some 1.4 billion, have won a total of six
prizes in a small number of fields, the same number as the Irish. For intelligent Muslims around
the world, there is a pressing sense of having been let down by history. How, for
example, is it possible, that a country such as Iran—one of the most civilized
and creative countries on the planet, a culture that has created some of the
greatest literature on earth, with a vibrant art and architecture, perhaps the
greatest cuisine in the Middle East, music of great sensitivity and power, and
a language that has spread throughout Central Asia and down through Afghanistan
into India—has made no serious contributions to the modern world outside of
cinema? What went wrong? Muslims face a
horrid choice: Either God is punishing them for some collective sin, or God has
abandoned them. It is unthinkable that communities like the Christians and
Jews, whom Islam teaches to be inferior, or even outright idolaters such as the
Japanese should enjoy the good things that had been promised to the Muslims in
the Qur'an.[22] But, there is a flip side: If enough
Muslims believed that God is punishing them or had abandoned them, faith would
be undermined, and Islamic society would break down.
This clearly has not occurred.
Jihadist treatises such as Qutb's Milestones, Sayyid Abu A'la Mawdudi's
"The Islamic Movement," or Taqi al-Din Nabhani's Nizam al-Islam
(The system of Islam) have filled the intellectual hole. Muslim Brotherhood
ideologue Sayyid Qutb preached a jihad not just against the West but against
what he saw as a backsliding, corrupt, and "non-Muslim" Islamic
world. Governments that did not implement the Shari‘a (Islamic law), women who
did not veil, those who listened to Western music, those who gambled,
fornicated, or drank alcohol—all fell under the condemnation of jahiliyya
(pagan ignorance). Such logic enabled militant Muslims to justify their
doctrine of ongoing jihad even though Islamic weakness dictates a cessation of
hostilities, at least in the form of a truce. Such beliefs have led inexorably
to the current wave of Al-Qaeda terrorism and to the continuing aggression of
Hamas and Hezbollah. There is a tendency by some
Western commentators and journalists to forward moral equivalency in the name
of balance. A 2005 Guardian article, for example, argued that both
Israelis and Palestinians should acknowledge the harm they have done to the
other and concede that both parties deserve blame.[23] More recently, fewer Israeli casualties
in Sderot are "balanced" against greater Palestinian loss of life in
Gaza even though the first is the result of terrorism against a civilian
population and the latter of actions taken in defense of a sovereign state. The status of Palestinians as
victims remains a central plank in their platform to the present day. The
Western audience may have become accustomed to such claims, but they are a
historical anomaly. Until recently, Sunni Muslims never conceived their history
around victim status—quite the opposite, in fact. Their view of history was,
until recently, triumphalist. They have conquered; they have converted, and
they have built empires. Islamist texts and sermons are replete with a new form
of triumphalism: a refusal to concede that Muslims have moved to a state of
inferiority, or that Jews or Christians have put them there. A recent cartoon
on Hamas's Al-Aqsa television depicts a small child as he stabs George Bush to
death and turns the White House into a mosque.[24] Such programs are fantasies that fill
the minds of Arab children with impossible dreams. Just as fantastic are the
hundreds of conspiracy theories that proclaim a belief in hidden forces that
sap the strength and suck dry the veins of Muslims. These conspiracies depict
Muslims as the true victims of the modern age. Take, for example, this excerpt
from the Kuwait Times: [Professor Ali Mazrui] said
that Muslims are victims of violent injustice elsewhere in the world without
the globalisation of anger against the United States. Muslims in Kashmir and
Chechnya in their struggle for self-determination are victims of the wrath of
state security forces, he cited, for example. Muslims in Macedonia are trying
to cope with discrimination from Christian Macedonians; Muslims in Kosovo are
facing the risk of reintegration with Yugoslavia against their will; Muslims in
Afghanistan faced the Soviet Union earlier and defeated it; the Afghans have
now endured military action by the United States.[25] Many in the modern Muslim
diaspora focus on the concept of Islamophobia, conflating criticism with fear
and justifying violent reaction to any offense, real or imagined, that has few
parallels with any other religious community. Psychologically, the combination
of an unyielding belief in Muslim superiority and a paranoid belief in the
power of satanic Jews and impious Christians is a major factor in preventing
Muslims from advancing. Blame is placed entirely on outside forces; there is
little individual or group accountability. Modern Hudna What does this mean for the
present hudna, or any that is likely to follow it? The jihad is waged
against the entire world, but Israel has become its focus. Since the jihad is
deemed unending, and since Israel is going to stay, there will be no end to the
religiously-inspired struggle. The Hamas covenant, for example, is unequivocal:
"There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through jihad.
Initiatives, proposals, and international conferences are all a waste of time
and vain endeavors."[26] The best that the international
community can hope to achieve is a political solution, but this cannot occur
unless a way is found not only to control the violent tendencies of the
extremists but also to rework Muslim theology and social thought. There is no
Muslim equivalent to Reform, Conservative, or Reconstructionist Judaism. Almost
all the great Muslim thinkers of the last century have been deeply
conservative. For Muslims, the challenge is
to move from a worldview that sees all other religions and all non-Muslim
people as inferior, Satanic, ignorant, and subject to Muslim conquest to one
that coheres more closely with modern thinking in Europe, the Americas, and the
Far East, where there is competition between nations and corporations, but
where religious hatred is increasingly relegated to the history books. Others
may have to abandon similar prejudices, but the extent of Islamic terrorism,
its link to the provisions of the Shari‘a, and the gulf between Islamic
thinking on human rights and the norms of the original Declaration of Human
Rights,[27] justify concentration on Islamic
intolerance as a special problem. It is surely time for leaders to emerge
within the Muslim world capable of guiding their people towards peace and
humanity. A long-term truce between Israel and the Palestinians would surely be
a good start. However, it is difficult to see
how Israel or the West can have confidence in Hamas's long-term aims. Its
position suggests a wholesale rejection of any mediated, peaceful resolution of
the conflict.[28] Can Western governments do
anything to prevent a new hudna running its usual course? Diplomats may
propose carrot and stick strategies, offering financial and political
incentives to dismantle the culture of violence with disincentives for any
return to killing. In the end, though, the onus is on the Palestinians and
their allies. If they could impose a hudna on their own side and not
fire Qassam and Grad rockets, smuggle weapons, or infiltrate suicide bombers
into Israel, there could be a chance for Gaza to develop. But such a scenario
is a pipe dream so long as Hamas remains a viable entity. Denis MacEoin holds a Ph.D. in Persian studies from the University of
Cambridge. He taught Arabic and Islamic Studies at Newcastle University and was
for many years an honorary fellow at Durham University. He is currently the
Royal Literary Fund Fellow at Newcastle University and author of The
Hijacking of British Islam (Policy Exchange, 2007). [1] See, for
example, "jihad," Asharq al-Awsat (London), May 22, 2007;
"mujahid," CNN.com, May 20, 2007; "fedayeen," Hindustan
Times (New Delhi), May
24, 2007; "shahid," The New York Sun, May 24, 2007;
"hudna," New Statesman (London), May 28, 2007. |
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