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European Converts to
Terrorism by Milena
Uhlmann Conversion to Islam among
native Europeans is on the rise. Many converts live at peace within their
native societies; some convert only for marriage, and reject neither
contemporary culture nor Europe's Judeo-Christian values. A minority, however,
embraces radical interpretations of Islam and can pose a security risk. The
involvement of Muslim converts in recent terrorist attacks has raised concern
in Europe about these "converts to terrorism." While intelligence
agencies and security services track international communications and guard
borders, such homegrown terrorists pose just as potent a threat to the security
of Western democracies. European security services and politicians remain
unprepared to handle this growing phenomenon. A Growing
Problem In Europe, there is very little
hard data on conversion to Islam due to the difficulty of gathering proper
statistics. Because Muslim communities usually have an informal structure and
no formal clergy, most do not keep records. In France, for instance, state
agencies do not record citizens' religious affiliations; to do so, French
officials say, would counter France's commitment to secularism. In German
registration offices, Muslim residents are included in a pool of "diverse
religious affiliations."[1] German converts apparently account for
only a small portion—between 12,000 and 100,000—of Germany's total Muslim population
of 2.8-3.2 million,[2] which itself comprises less than 4
percent of the total population of Germany. In 2006, the Federal Ministry of
the Interior commissioned a study from the Zentralinstitut Islam-Archiv
Deutschland (ZIIAD) to determine the number of converts, but amid suspicion over
the ZIIAD's methodology, discounted as exaggerated its findings and ended its
relationship with the institute.[3] Nevertheless, it appears that
both conversions and Islamist outreach to converts is increasing. Thomas Hamza
Fischer, founder of the Islamisches Informationszentrum (IIZ) in Ulm, a city in
Baden-Württemberg known for its radical Islamist scene, died fighting in
Chechnya.[4] The IIZ's journal, Denk mal Islamisch
(Think Islamic) is geared to converts, addressing issues such as emotional and
personal support. The police, the German Federal Office for the Protection of
the Constitution (FOC), as well as the Islamisches Informationszentrum's
neighbors say that more German converts have visited the center since summer
2007 than they had in seasons past.[5] Apparently anticipating a ban by the
Bavarian Ministry of Interior, the IIZ dissolved in October 2007.[6] In recent years, police and
intelligence services have become increasingly aware of the threat of homegrown
terrorism. In 2003, Judge Jean Louis Bruguière, the former French investigating
magistrate in charge of counterterrorism affairs, observed that Al-Qaeda had
increased its recruiting efforts in Europe and in particular was on the lookout
for women and converts to Islam.[7] In March 2004, the Dutch General
Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) released an analysis of jihadi
recruits' backgrounds,[8] and the following year, the British Home
and Foreign Offices released a similar study.[9] In August 2007, the New York Police
Department released a report on radicalization within Western societies,
focusing on trends in homegrown terrorism and emphasizing the increasing role
of converts in terror plots.[10] Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany's federal
minister of the interior, argues that the prevalence of homegrown jihadis is
increasing.[11]
The 2004 murder of Dutch
filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, the Madrid train bombings the same year, and the
following year's attacks on London's Tube and bus system demonstrate that
European citizens and residents can conduct horrendous acts against their
respective countries. The culmination of this trend will be the planning of and
participation in such attacks by European converts to Islam. On September 4, 2007, the
German security services arrested three men for plotting car bomb attacks in
Germany targeting the U.S. military base at Ramstein and pubs and nightclubs
frequented by Americans.[12] Two of the three were German-born
converts to Islam.[13] This plot was not the first involving
German converts. In 1997, Israeli security services detained Steven Smyrek at
Ben Gurion International Airport as he tried to enter Israel to survey possible
Hezbollah terror targets.[14] Christian Ganczarski, a Polish immigrant
of German descent who had converted to Islam in 1986, played a major role as
the intermediary between Al-Qaeda's leadership and the suicide bomber who
carried out the 2002 bombing of a Tunisian synagogue in Djerba, which killed
twenty-one people.[15] In 2006, the German police arrested
Sonja B., a 40-year-old German convert who sought to travel to Iraq with her
1-year-old son and to carry out a suicide attack.[16] For Islamist terrorists, the
European convert is a prized recruit, at ease in society, cognizant of informal
rules and opportunities, and able to move freely without arousing suspicion.
Their citizenship enables them to travel freely under the terms of the European
Schengen agreement and, in many cases, the U.S. visa waiver program.[17] Richard Reid, a British convert to Islam
who attempted to blow up an airliner with explosives hidden in his shoes and
boarded a flight to the United States under the visa waiver program,
highlighted the threat of European converts to terrorism to both their own
homelands and U.S. security. Short of requiring visas for British, French, and
German passport holders, U.S. authorities have requested that airlines provide
detailed passenger rosters for incoming flights to the United States. European
carriers have followed suit. Identifying
Terrorist Converts European security services are
unsure of how to address the problem of radicalized converts largely due to
their uncertainty about how to integrate competing security and civil liberties
interests. On one hand, the abandonment of passport control posts along
internal European borders—the heart of the European integration process—needs
to be addressed; EU states must adjust to the fact that criminal enterprises
span borders. On the other hand, the European public distrusts any measure that
might lead European institutions, let alone a European intelligence service, to
increase surveillance, especially given the opacity of EU decision-making. At the national level, however,
there is perhaps a greater sense of urgency in monitoring converts to
terrorism. In September 2007, Günther Beckstein, the Bavarian minister of the
interior, proposed registering and observing every convert to Islam in Germany
in order to determine whether the future Muslim would pursue a liberal or an
Islamist orientation.[18] This suggestion provoked an uproar.
Critics said it put converts under general suspicion, undercut religious
dialogue, and contradicted the principle of religious freedom. Such populist
tactics, though, are likely to be counterproductive. Nothing is gained by
placing converts under surveillance simply because they married a Muslim or
found religious satisfaction through Islamic theology. Such tactics might
backfire if they alienate the convert, and they would require a massive
investment in intelligence gathering for a questionable return. They would also
be domestically unpopular: Europeans would certainly argue that turning all
converts to Islam into terrorism suspects runs counter to the ideals of
European liberalism. Profiling potential terrorists,
however, should not be taboo. Doing so requires an understanding of the
mentality of both the individual convert and of the group into which the
individual converts. Many converts embrace their new faith with zeal, and
Islamist groups can channel this fervor into a process of quick radicalization.[19] New converts are often less proficient
in religious matters than religious leaders but are eager to fill in the gaps,
making them susceptible to indoctrination by organizations like the Islamisches
Informationszentrum. In larger cities such as
Berlin, advocates of various Islamic trends often recruit new converts. Among
the most aggressive are the Salafists.[20] Converts wanting to explore and learn
more about their new religion are often attracted to fundamentalist
interpretations as they seek "pure" and "true" Islam.
Jihadi websites reinforce this search—indeed, this was how Sonja B., the
would-be Iraq suicide bomber, discovered militant Islam.[21] Foreign scholarships also
provide a means of recruitment. After his conversion but prior to becoming
involved in terrorism, Ganczarski, the German Al-Qaeda intermediary, studied
Islam on a scholarship at the University of Medina, described by the Deutsches
Orient-Institut as a "recruiting pool" for Islamists.[22] After his arrest, Ganczarski said there
had been a recruitment wave for such scholarships in Germany in the mid-1990s,
focusing on young converts. After he returned from Saudi Arabia where he
probably became radicalized, he went on to Chechnya and Pakistan as well as
Afghanistan[23] where he met Osama bin Laden.[24] Apparently, Saudi Arabia provided
thousands of such scholarships.[25] The background of the convert
is as important as the nature of the absorbing group. Those who convert to
Islam for practical purposes, for example, to marry a Muslim woman, seldom
become extremists. Others are predisposed to radicalism. Smyrek is an extreme
example: He was always a radical and actively sought out Islamist terror groups
in order to become a suicide bomber. The convert's socioeconomic
background is another vital factor. Conversion is, in part, a migration from
one worldview to another,[26] described by sociologist Thomas Luckmann
as a decision to go shopping in a supermarket of religious goods.[27] As the individual tries to reconcile his
old and new belief systems, he selects explanations that best meet his needs.
Sometimes, this involves the endorsement of terrorism as a means of righting
perceived wrongs. Motives to
Convert There seem to be three dominant
motives behind the decision to convert to Islam: First is the search for a
group that will provide the convert with meaning and guidance—for example, by
adherence to Shari‘a (Islamic law), which provides rules that the convert
believes are "not arbitrary," like man-made laws.[28] The assumption of religious faith often
involves a person's search for a higher purpose, a desire to cease living
"from one party to the next or one basketball game to the next."[29] The quest for social integration is
another important factor: "When I meet brothers I have never seen before,
I feel at home right away and accepted,"[30] explained one convert. Second, a convert may seek a
means by which he can articulate his criticism of Western society or share with
others his sense of alienation from the dominant culture: "I became Muslim
when communism collapsed, and I didn't want capitalism. And you have to do
something."[31] Third, he may desire a way of
life that allows the individual to express his views in his everyday routine if
only by praying five times a day. ("I feel like I am living in a parallel
society. But I feel marvelous."[32]) Because Islam often has a
negative reputation in Europe, conversion to Islam enables the convert to
project sentiments of rebellion. Indeed, Olivier Roy from the French Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique has suggested that radical Islam is tantamount
to a protest identity.[33] Some converts emphatically champion
Islam as the best alternative to post-industrial Western society. Such is the
rationale for Murad Wilfried Hofmann,[34] a former German diplomat who converted
to Islam in 1980 and has since acted as an intellectual leader for German
converts. Ayyub Axel Köhler, the current chairman of the Zentralrat der Muslime
in Deutschland, who converted to Islam in 1963, has remarked that Islam is a
way of life and thus offers its adherents the chance to avoid the alienation of
life in Western societies.[35] If the numbers of conversions to Islam
in the West are on the rise, the cultural criticism underlying such conversions
becomes especially relevant. Identity issues play an important role, as does
globalization and modern communications, which have allowed the exploration of
new identities. When societies lose their coherence, threats increase from
within.[36] Conclusions The European Union member
states face a new challenge today, one that transcends the traditional national
security paradigm that separates internal and external threats. In a federation
of states on a scale as large as the EU, the aim of promoting peace and
stability is intertwined with the national interests of the member states and
their ability to collaborate on ensuring the security of the larger whole.[37] The answer to questions about how to
balance civil liberties with legitimate security concerns remains elusive. What makes a common policy so
hard to achieve when it comes to the jurisdiction of the European Justice and
Home Affairs Council is the fact that judicial matters and law enforcement
policy remain national rather than transnational efforts. The independent framework for
cooperation on justice and home affairs, set up with the Treaty of Maastricht
in 1993, has remained intergovernmental; decisions must be unanimous, creating
a situation in which negotiations often carry on for years and lead to complex
legal restrictions. Even though the 9-11 attacks changed priorities and created
the impetus for institutional restructuring, EU member states remain unwilling
to surrender sovereignty over internal security matters. Another problem is that
differing national judicial systems create structural disincentives to
collaboration.[38] The upshot is that there remains
significant, informal cross-border cooperation,[39] and, for that matter, informal
intelligence collection and sharing. As long as the Constitutional Treaty—which
would centralize the Justice and Home Affairs portfolios so that European Union
institutions and law would become paramount to state law in these cases—remains
un-ratified, this is not likely to change. The creation of the post of the
EU coordinator for counterterrorism after the 2004 Madrid attacks was a step in
the right direction, but the coordinator lacks the mandate and resources to
span national boundaries. As Wolfgang Münchau, associate editor of Financial
Times, has noted, "Terrorists in Europe think more European
than many of Europe's homeland security-related agencies."[40] Ultimately, European states are
responsible for their citizens. If individual states remain unwilling to cede
certain aspects of their sovereignty to the kind of European institutions that
could more effectively monitor Islamist activities across Europe, their ability
to collaborate on security will suffer, and ultimately their security itself
will suffer. In order for this process to move forward, the EU needs to begin a
dialogue that addresses the security problems that arise from the Islamist
community, rather than denouncing discussions of the problem as
"Islamophobic." Milena Uhlmann is a research associate at the Institut für Europäische
Politik in Berlin. [1] See Thomas
Lemmen, Islamische Organisationen in Deutschland (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, 2000), p. 18. |
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