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The Rise of the Chechen Emirate? by Dmitry Shlapentokh Chechnya has been at war with
Russia for generations. By 1999, when the second Chechen war broke out, two
resistance groups had emerged: nationalists and jihadists. While long simmering
below the surface, the schism between the two camps erupted publicly in 2006 on
the Internet after Akhmed Khalidovich Zakaev, the moderate foreign minister of
the shadow Chechen government, argued that the goal of the Chechen resistance
should be an independent Chechen state modeled after Western democracies and
integrated into the global community. Movladi Udugov, a jihadist and editor of Kavkaz
Center, the best-known online resistance publication, vehemently disagreed
and declared that for real Muslims, spiritual bonds should be more important
than blood ties. He argued that he would rather embrace ethnic Russians who had
converted to Islam than Chechens who had strayed from their religion. There was
no point modeling society after Western states, he contended, because all
non-Muslim states, or those that are Muslim only in name but not in essence,
are corrupt. Instead, Chechens should fight for the establishment of a global
caliphate. In October 2007, this
ideological conflict led to a definitive split when Sheikh Doku (Dokka)
Khamatovich Umarov, shadow president of the Chechen Republic, threw his support
behind Udugov. Umarov endorsed the dissolution of the republic and its
replacement by an Islamist "emirate" and argued that Chechens, as
Muslims, cannot live outside Islam and must defend all Muslims. The dispute
between Umarov and Zakaev provides insight not only into the future direction
of the Chechen movement but also into the tactics and strategy of global
jihadists and the resistance they face from nationalist Muslims. Chechen
Resistance Tension in Chechnya existed
during the Soviet period and grew through the Gorbachev years. Chechen
resistance erupted openly in 1994.[1] As the first Chechen war (1994-96)
proceeded, the friction between nationalist resistance leaders and their
Islamist counterparts grew. By the start of the second Chechen war in 1999,
jihadists began pressing the Chechen government. A certain Khanif, a
contributor to Chechenpress, argued that the jihadists began to press
the Chechen government almost from the start of the second Chechen war. In
1999, Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen president who took power after the death of
Dzjokhar Dudaev in 1996, introduced Islamic law. Three years later, Shamil
Salmanovich Basayev (1965-2006), one of the best-known radical commanders,
declared the Chechen state to be a "dead body."[2] The jihadists apparently had become the
leading force in the Chechen resistance and proclaimed that turning to jihad
was the only way to victory.[3] The Formal
Split The Chechen leadership's
divorce was nasty. Both sides sought to delegitimize the other. Umarov, the
Islamist, argued that those who represent the Chechen resistance should be in
the Caucasus risking their lives, not enjoying comfort in exile. He painted
Zakaev and his nationalist followers as not only having ceased to be Muslims
but also as pawns of adventurers like Boris Berezovsky, a corrupt tycoon
prominent during the Yeltsin era (1991-99) who escaped to the West following
Russian president Vladimir Putin's accession. Guilt by association was a
frequent theme. Jihadist websites show Zakaev not only in the company of
Berezovsky but also of Yurii Filshtinskii, a Russian-Jewish émigré and
historian who had coauthored a book with the late Alexander Litvinenko accusing
the Russian secret police, Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), of
staging bombings in several apartment buildings in 1999 to create a pretext for
Russia to launch the second Chechen war. Indeed, Russian authorities accused
Chechens of the bombings. Putin, in his position as prime minister and Yeltsin
heir, proclaimed that he would pursue terrorists everywhere and launch a
full-fledged assault on Chechnya. The jihadist sites also
presented Zakaev as an associate of Ramzan Kadyrov, the Putin-appointed Russian
viceroy of Chechnya, and, by extension, an ally of Putin himself. Zakaev supporters, on the other
hand, depicted jihadists as Islamist Bolsheviks, fanatics lacking strategy and
indifferent to ordinary Chechens. Such an accusation resonates among Russians
and those living among them: Vladimir Lenin was indifferent to the outbreak of
World War I because, he believed, the misery accompanying that conflict could
catalyze revolution.[4] As Lenin cooperated with anyone—even
German Kaiser Wilhelm—to achieve his aims, so too did Zakaev accuse Umarov of
striking bargains with his arch foe Putin. After all, both Putin and the
Islamists sought political gain at the expense of Chechen blood. Abdul-Malik
Isaev, a contributor to Chechenpress, explained: In
1917, the major ideologists of Bolshevism, following the bidding and [with] the
money received from Germany, staged a military coup in Russia and proclaimed
the words that became famous: "Comrades! Revolution, the necessity of
which the Bolsheviks have [fore]told for such a long time, has finally taken
place!" Today in Chechnya, the events are essentially the same—Dokka
[Umarov] has confirmed his decision to promulgate a "Caucasian
emirate," the "necessity" of which our
"Islamist-radicals" of Bolshevik "mazhab" have [fore]told
for a long time. The traitors of the Chechen people still await Shari‘a court
for their provocative call for a Dagestan campaign, putting their knives in the
back of our people and our state.[5] While Lenin believed that only
he could interpret Marxism, Umarov and Udugov––the "green
commissars"––believed that they alone were the true interpreters of Islam.
Many Chechen government officials distanced themselves from Umarov after his
October 2007 declaration of an emirate.[6] As foreign minister, Zakaev declared
himself leader of the Chechen government-in-exile and demanded that Chechen
representatives abroad should follow his orders.[7] Umarov's declaration of an emirate took
the Chechen parliament by surprise; and after receiving no answer from Umarov
to the question of how he could occupy a position that does not exist in the
Chechen constitution,[8] Zhaloud Lema Sarliapov, chairman of the
Chechen parliament, proclaimed that power in the Chechen Republic should belong
to parliament, and not to the president, who had actually abdicated his
position.[9] Others, such as the Chechen veterans of
its Russian wars and a parliamentarian who was also the brother of Chechnya's
former vice president, also took Zakaev's side. Sultan Asaev, a colonel in the
resistance army, said that Chechens who had suffered in fighting the "fascist
dictatorship" should protest the creation of an "emirate" that
would lead to even greater tragedy.[10] Salambek Amaev, a former military
commandant and representative of the Chechen Republic in Poland, also
protested.[11] Zakaev also won the support of
the Chechen "elders" who in traditional society are seen as the
ultimate moral authorities. Alla Dudaev, widow of the first Chechen president,
Dzjokhar Dudaev, argued that the promulgation of the emirate was a betrayal of
her martyred husband's life's work. [12] Chechen elders in Istanbul, Udugov's
city of residence, also flocked to Zakaev's side despite Udugov's assertions to
the contrary.[13] Zakaev also received considerable
support from the approximately half-million strong Chechen diaspora. The
consuls of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and representatives of the Chechen
diaspora stated that if Umarov believed he needed more titles to engage in the
liberation of the Caucasus, he could just resign from the presidency of the
Chechen Republic and take whatever title he wished.[14] While Chechnya has newspapers,
most are controlled and do not permit open debate. Most Chechens, especially
those in the diaspora, turn to websites for news and to debate ideas.
The editorial boards of some Chechen websites dissociated themselves from
Umarov. The board of the Daymohk news agency, which had served since the
administration of former Chechen president Abdul Khalim Sadulaev (2005-06) as
presidential spokesman, severed its connection with Umarov.[15] The split divided other Internet papers
into two camps. While the Chechentimes adopted a pro-Umarov position, Chechenpress
contributor Mairbek Taramov urged readers to be aware that the Chechentimes
had nothing to do with the old Chechen Times, which had been "the
vehicle of a European-oriented group of Chechens."[16] Lastly, the declaration of the
emirate antagonized Chechnya's foreign supporters. Adam Borovskii, consul of
the Chechen Republic in Poland, proclaimed that he and "his Polish
friends" had done their best to liberate Chechnya. But now, after the
promulgation of the emirate, he saw the Chechen leaders identifying themselves
with Al-Qaeda, something with which he wanted no connection.[17] Zakaev became de facto leader of
the Chechen government-in-exile. Delegitimizing
Jihadists Any divorce is difficult. In
order to justify the schism to the broader Chechen community, Zakaev developed
a number of arguments to justify his claim to leadership. First, he argued,
since Umarov had implicitly abandoned the presidency, he, Zakaev, could not be
his representative.[18] In Umarov's stead, parliament should
take power. Second, Zakaev argued that the
declaration of the emirate made it impossible to cooperate with Kadyrov's
government. Even before the February 2007 split, Zakaev had developed the
notion that Moscow was losing control over Chechnya and that Kadyrov's regime
had become part of the Chechen opposition. For example, he argued that its
security forces and militia are perhaps 70 to 80 percent former members of the
resistance, who uphold Chechen independence in their heart.[19] Kadyrov's trend toward independence
provided the opportunity, Zakaev suggested, for compromise with the moderate
segments of the Chechen resistance. The declaration of the emirate upset any
chance at compromise. Udugov and Umarov wanted, Zakaev implied, a war without
end.[20] Pushing this further, Zakaev
put forth a third argument: that Russian intelligence played a role in the
declaration of an emirate. He alleged that the FSB had met with and bribed
members of the Chechen resistance; rumors spread that about half a billion
dollars changing hands.[21] These Russian agents, Zakaev said, had
convinced Umarov to abrogate the Chechen constitution, abolish the Chechen
state, and proclaim an emirate, thereby giving Moscow justification for war
against the Chechen resistance by arguing that it was fighting against a branch
of Al-Qaeda.[22] The corruption argument
resonated. Larisa Volodimerova, a contributor to Chechenpress, suggested
that Udugov and Putin cynically collaborated to profit at the expense of the
Chechen people.[23] Others noted that many jihadist leaders
lived in luxury. Udugov, for example, lived well in Istanbul with his four
wives, seemingly with no regard for the families of jihadists killed and
wounded in Chechnya. [24] Chechenpress contributor Turko
Dikaev stated with an air of irony that it might turn out that the reason for
Umarov's promulgation of the emirate was quite personal and quite petty. Beyond
profit, the move would enable Umarov to purge Zakaev since a foreign ministry
would no longer be necessary.[25] Most of Zakaev's supporters
accepted his arguments. Umarov's desire to build an emirate defied logic. One
contributor to Ichkeria FR—the Internet publication of the Chechen
diaspora in France—said that Umarov justified his plan to create an emirate by
arguing it would help Chechens find support for their struggle among the other
people of the Caucasus although a regional emirate based on Islam rather than
nationality would require the dissolution of the Chechen state. Absent the
emirate declaration, Chechens could preserve their own state and strike
alliances with the other people of the Caucasus.[26] Zakaev's backers countered that idea by
noting that Umarov's actions would alienate the Chechen resistance from the
major global powers and by suggesting that even if bribery did not motivate
Umarov, he had certainly overestimated the importance of Islam in Chechen life. Chechenpress contributor Larisa Volodimerova argued that those who
proclaimed the emirate repeated mistakes made by past Chechen leaders, such as
Shamil, who tried to create a theocratic state: They believed that Islam would
solidify the Chechen ranks and make them resolute fighters for independence.
But the Islamization of Chechen life and theocratic despotism led to the
opposite result: Chechens resent autocracy, theocratic or otherwise, and chose
not to fight for it.[27] El'mira Magometova, another Chechenpress
contributor, argued that Chechens had never regarded Islam as an essential
aspect of their national identity and noted that Islam only came to Chechnya in
the seventeenth century. Further, she argued, a major reason for Imam Shamil's
defeat in 1859 was Chechens' intolerance toward monarchy; many assumed Shamil
had such ambitions. Another contributor stated that he could, of course, be
regarded as a heretic, but he did not believe the Qur'an could be used as a
detailed guide in present-day society: It could only provide a general outline
for behavior.[28] Vakhi Surko, another Chechenpress
contributor, argued that those who promulgated the emirate and joined the
global jihadist movement had alienated the global community.[29] A certain Iskander, a contributor to Chechenpress,
stated that the supporters of the emirate actually said that they intended to
engage in a war with the entire world, which he said is sheer madness.[30] Irchula Shmaiser, another contributor,
supported this view. She stated that the jihadists are mocked as insane because
they actually propose jihad without end.[31] While the emirate's proponents
said they were not bothered by the absence of international support—the global
community does not care about Chechen suffering, they argued—Surko countered
that, however true, needless antagonism of the international community was a
misstep since it drew the world closer to Russia because of international
antagonism to Al-Qaeda and its jihad. But the belief that Putin and Islamists
cooperated resonates in the North Caucasus. Chechen writers blame the 1999 war in
Dagestan, launched after terrorists blew up apartment buildings in Moscow and
Volgodonsk, on both Putin and the Islamists. Subsequent Islamist terrorist
attacks in Dubrovka and Beslan provided the Kremlin with justification to
continue its war against Chechen civilians.[32] In the view of other Chechenpress
contributors, events suggest a Putin role.[33] "There is a clear understanding
that Udugov worked together with the FSB,"[34] one Chechen writer declared. Not only might the emirate help
Putin justify war against the Chechen resistance, [35] but it could drive a wedge between
Chechnya and the West.[36] The West might be transformed from
passive and often sympathetic observers into Chechnya's enemy and Russia's
helper. Even after the September 2004 school massacre in Beslan, many
Westerners expressed sympathy toward the Chechen cause.[37] Since that attack, there have been no
major terrorist attacks against civilians. Should there be, however, Moscow
would be able to link Chechen resistance with international terrorism. Prior to
Udugov's statements, most Americans did not regard the Chechen resistance as
part of the global terrorist movement.[38] Nor would reliance on global
Islamism necessarily help Chechnya. Khanif suggested that the umma, the
global community of Muslims who band together for justice and liberty, is an
illusion, existing more in the minds of jihadist ideologues than in real life.
He questioned the assumption that Muslim people and Muslim governments care
about Chechens. The Muslim world is not only disunited but also corrupt and
remains the "old, sinful man." The mythical heroic umma united
for the common struggle is similar to the mythical global proletariat whose
heroic faculties and sense of solidarity exist only in the minds of believers.[39] One contributor to Chechenpress
proclaimed that the Chechen people are more the victims of Islamists than of
Putin.[40] The conflict between Islamists
and nationalists is irreconcilable and may lead to internecine violence within
the Chechen resistance. While Zakaev may entrench himself in Europe as a good,
"moderate" nationalist, Islamists will increasingly consolidate the
battlefield. Chechnya might be for them just a weak link in the global chain of
the "worldwide revolution." While Chechens will form the entirety of
the moderate nationalists, the jihadists will embrace a variety of ethnic
groups connected not just with foreign jihadists but with a network of
Islamic—and possibly non-Islamic––extremists all over Russia. In this way, the
Islamist movement in Chechnya parallels the Bolshevik movement in Russia in the
years prior to World War I. Conclusion What of the implications of the
schism within the Chechen movement? Jihadists are unpopular among many in the
Chechen diaspora, most of whom would like to be seen as legitimate political
refugees promoting an understandable cause rather than representatives of an Al-Qaeda
type movement. Western politicians sympathetic to Chechen nationalism will
certainly side with Zakaev. In embattled Chechnya, quite a few—at least judging
by Internet discussions—might opt for Kadyrov's rule, which provides some
modicum of stability and a chance for gainful employment for Chechen youth.
Still, the small but dedicated groups of jihadists will not evaporate because
of the lack of recruits: Regardless of what Chechens think of their cause,
jihadists can attract Islamic extremists from across Russia and around the
world. What would be the implications
of the small, dedicated bands of religious zealots in the Caucasus for Russia
and ultimately the world? Here, comparison between Bolsheviks and jihadists is
enlightening. Those who study the Bolshevik movement offer many arguments for
its victory. Some credit Lenin's political genius; others, Marxist ideology or
the centralized structure of the party. These elements played important roles,
but there is another aspect of the story, which is the Bolshevik similarity to
a religious movement. Bolshevik messianism led the movement to persist even
when Russia's political and social order was stable. For Lenin, as well as for
many other radicals in Europe, the revolution was just an abstraction. In fact,
Russia had not experienced a mass upheaval since the Pugachev rebellion in the
late eighteenth century, and Europe had not experienced a major revolution
since that of the Paris Commune in 1871. Still, the Bolsheviks faithfully
believed both in their providential mission and in the instability of the
global order and persisted. So when they appeared to be right, and the global
order collapsed in the wake of WWI, they were quick to take advantage of the
opportunity. The same could be said about the jihadists. If Russia remains
stable, the jihadists' influence on Russia and global politics most likely will
be marginal. But if a breakdown happens—what Russians call katastroika—the
extremists and jihadists, like the Bolsheviks before them, will play an important
role in shaping events, at least in the North Caucasus. If this were indeed to
happen, the present split in the Chechen resistance would be seen as important
as the split between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks more than a hundred years
ago. Dmitry Shlapentokh is an associate professor at Indiana University-South
Bend. [1] James Hughes, Chechnya,
From Nationalism to Jihad (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2007), pp. 16-18. |
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